Ay - Dede ile Öksüz kiz efsanesi:

Insanoglu parlak gecelerde aya bakmis ve aydaki lekeler üzerinde uzun uzun düsünmüstü. Bu lekeler üzerinde hayal kuran insanlar, ayrica onlar için siirler yazmis ve efsaneler de düzmüslerdi. Bugün Avrupa'daki masallar bile, ayda bir sirigin ucuna iki tane kova takmis bir kizin, yürüyüp durdugunu anlatir dururlar. Orta Asya'daki efsaneler de, ay da sirikla su tasiyan iki kovali bir kizin yürüdügünden söz açarlar. Bu inanisin Avrupa'dan mi, Orta Asya ve Sibirya ya; yoksa Sibirya'dan mi, Avrupa'ya gittigini, simdiden kestirmek çok güçtür. Yalniz bir gerçek varsa, o da Sibirya'nin buzlu ve karanlik Tundralarindan, doguda Bering bogazina ve hatta Amerika kitasinin kuzeyindeki Alaska yerlilerine kadar, bu inanisin yayilmis oldugudur. Ne olursa olsun, bu içli ve güzel masalin, Kuzey Sibirya'daki Yakut Türklerinde söylenen iki degisik anlatilisini, burada özetlemeden geçemeyecegiz.

Annesiz bir kiz varmis, su tasirmis sirikla,
Geceleri aglarmis, soguktan hiçkirikla:
"Ey güzel ay, ey kutsal, ne olursun beni al!
"Buraya gel suya dal, es yap beni göge Sal!"
Dermis kiz haykirirmis, hep aya yalvarirmis,
Imdada çagirirmis, sesi göge varirmis.
Çok soguk bir geceymis kiz yine suya gitmis,
Ay da gece gökteymis, kiz için yere inmis.
Ay hemen kizi almis, ta evine götürmüs,
Ay her dolun oldukça bu kiz ay da görünmüs

DEFINING MYTH
From the Greek mythos, myth means story or word. Mythology is the study of myth. As stories (or narratives), myths articulate how characters undergo or enact  an ordered sequence of events. The term myth has come to refer to a certain genre (or category) of stories that share characteristics that make this genre distinctly different from other genres of oral narratives, such as legends and folktales. Many definitions of myth repeat similar general aspects of the genre and may be summarized thus: Myths are symbolic tales of the distant past (often primordial times) that concern cosmogony and cosmology (the origin and nature of the universe), may be connected to belief systems or rituals, and may serve to direct social action and values.

 Altay ve Sibirya destanlarında da şeytan, ile insanoğlu, rekabet halinde idiler. Türk mitolojisi adlı eserimizde, bu efsanelerin hepsi bir araya getirilmiştir. Bu destanları şöyle özetleyelim:

İNSANIN YARATILIŞI

Bir insan sekli yapmis Tanri bir gün çamurdan.
Demis ki: "Insanoglu, türesin bu hamurdan!
Düsünmüs ki ne duyar, ne hisseder bu çamur,
Insanogluna çok var, yetismez yalniz hamur.
Demis: "Uçup çikayim göklere bir ruh bulayim,
"Çamura ruh katayim, tam bir Tanri olayim".
Tanri ne yaratsaymis, Seytan da kiskanirmis,
Hele firsat bulsaymis, ne korkar utanirmis.
Tanrinin çiplak tüysüz, bir de köpegi varmis,
Yabanciya vermez yüz, tepinerek havlarmis,
Tanir demis köpege: "Eger Seytan gelirse,
"Sakin aldanmayasin, sana bir sey verirse".
Bir ruh bulayim diye, Tanri uzaya çikmis;
Tanri ne yapmis diye, Seytan ortaya çikmis.
Köpek Seytani görmüs, korkutarak havlamis,
Bakip köpegi süzmüs, güzel sözle tavlamis.
Demis: "Ey köpek niçin tüysüzsün sen dogustan.
"Titriyor bak hep için, rahatin yok soguktan;
"Tanri'nin Insan'ina, gel yol ver bir bakayim;
"Senin tüysüz sirtina, altin tüyler takayim!"
Köpek bu söze kanmis, havlamamis Seytana,
Seytan çamuru almis, tükürmüs ilk insana.
Seytanin tükrügüyle, köpek de hep boyanmis,
Altin tüy buldum sanmis, pis tüylerle donanmis.
Tanri dönünce bakmis, insani tükrüklerle,
Köpek de dolasiyor, gururla pis tüylerle.
Köpege demis: "Doyma insandan rahat bulma.
"Nefret etsinler senden, dayaktan eksik olma!"
Tanridan killi imis, atasi ilk insanin,
(Vücudu da killiydi, aslinda Oguz-Han'in).
Seytanin tükrügünü, çevirmis Tanri içe,
" Insanin iç yüzünü, getirmis Tanri disa.
Insan ölümlü olmus, içi hastalik dolmus,
Fesat kalbini yolmus, insan gökten kovulmus.
Güzelmis distan insan, sakin bakip aldanma!
Güdermis içten Seytan, sakin aldanip kanma!


Şeytanın tükrükleri içinde kalan insanoğlu, hilek'r, yalancı ve kötü olmuş. Gerçi bu yüzden, insanın dışı temiz görünürmüş ama; Şeytanın tükrükleri ile dolu olan içi, fesatla sıvanmış imiş. Tanrı göklerde yaşasın diye yarattığı insanoğlunu, Şeytanın bu hareketi yüzünden beğenmemiş ve yeryüzüne indirmiş demiş ki: "- Git seni gözüm görmesin, git de yeryüzünde yaşa, gerektiği zaman öl ve gerektiği zaman da doğ! Sen gökyüzünde ölümsüz olarak yaşamağa lâyık bir mahlûk değilsin!" insanın içinde kalan şeytanın tükrükleri yüzünden hastalık doğmuş. Bunun için de insanoğlu hastalanır, iyileşir ve ölür olmuş. Anadolu'da şöyle atasözlerine çok rastlanır: "İnsanın alacası içinde, hayvanın alacası ise dışında!" Bizim Anadolu Türkleri böyle derler. Altay efsanelerine göre de, "Köpeğin pislikleri, tüylerinde; insanın ki ise, içinde kalmıştır".

Türk mitolojisinde günes, önceleri daha büyük bir öneme sahipti. M.S. 763 de Uygurlar "Mani" mezhebini kabul edince, yavas yavas "Ay"da büyük bir önem kazanmaga baslamisti. Bununla beraber Büyük Hun Devleti zamaninda hem günese, hem de aya, ayri ayri saygi gösterildikten sonra, kurbanlar kesildigini de biliyoruz. "Türklerde günes dogunun, ay da batinin sembolü idiler". Tabiî olarak zaman zaman, bütün bu düsünce düzenleri degise durmuslardi. Meselâ, Teleüt Türklerine ait bir efsane de, "Ay kuzeyin ve günes de, güneyin sembolü idiler". Bu yönleme, gögün en üst katinda duran "Gök kartali"nin durusuna göre yapilmisti. Söylendigine göre, "Bu kartalin sol kanadi ayi, sag kanadi da günesi örtüyordu". Bu duruma göre kartalin basinin doguya bakmasi gerekiyordu. Bu durus da, Türk mitolojisine uygun bir yönleme idi. Yine ayni efsaneye göre ay, karanliklar ve geceler diyari olan kuzeyin; günes de aydinligin hüküm sürdügü ve gündüzler diyari olan güneyin sembolü idiler.

"Ne Ay, ne Günes varmis, insanlar uçarlarmis.
"Uçanlar isi verir, isiklar saçarlarmis..."
Türk - Altay Efsanesinden

From Claude Levi-Strauss, Structural Anthropology. New York: Basic Books, 1963, pp. 202- 212.

The Structural Study of Myth

Claude Levi-Strauss

Despite some recent attempts to renew them, it seems that during, the past twenty years anthropology has increasingly turned from studies in the field of religion. At the same time, and precisely because the interest of professional anthropologists has withdrawn from primitive religion, all kinds of amateurs who claim to belong to other disciplines have seized this opportunity to move in, thereby turning into their private playground what we had left as a wasteland. The prospects for the scientific study of religion have thus been undermined in two ways. . . .

Of all the chapters of religious anthropology probably none has tarried to the same extent as studies in the field of mythology. From a theoretical point of view the situation remains very much the same as it was fifty years ago, namely, chaotic. Myths are still widely interpreted in conflicting ways: as collective dreams, as the outcome of a kind of esthetic play, or as the basis of ritual. Mythological figures are considered as personified abstractions, divinized heroes, or fallen gods. Whatever the hypothesis, the choice amounts to reducing mythology either to idle play or to a crude kind of philosophic speculation.

In order to understand what a myth really is, must we choose between platitude and sophism? Some claim that human societies merely express, through their mythology, fundamental feelings common to the whole of mankind, such as love, hate, or revenge or that they try to provide some kind of explanations for phenomena which they cannot otherwise understand--astronomical, meteorological, and the like. But why should these societies do it in such elaborate and devious ways, when all of them are also acquainted with empirical explanations? On the other hand, psychoanalysts and many anthropologists have shifted the problems away from the natural or cosmological toward the sociological and psychological fields. But then the interpretation becomes too easy: If a given mythology confers prominence on a certain figure, let us say an evil grandmother, it will be claimed that in such a society grandmothers are actually evil and that mythology reflects the social structure and the social relations; but should the actual data be conflicting, it would be as readily claimed that the purpose of mythology is to provide an outlet for repressed feelings. Whatever the situation, a clever dialectic will always find a way to pretend that a meaning has been found.

Mythology confronts the student with a situation which at first sight appears contradictory. On the one hand it would seem that in the course of a myth anything is likely to happen. There is no logic, no continuity. Any characteristic can be attributed to any subject; every conceivable relation can be found. With myth, everything becomes possible. But on the other hand, this apparent arbitrariness is belied by the astounding similarity between myths collected in widely different regions. Therefore the problem: If the content of a myth is contingent, how are we going to explain the fact that myths throughout the world are so similar?

It is precisely this awareness of a basic antinomy pertaining to the nature of myth that may lead us toward its solution. For the contradiction which we face is very similar to that which in earlier times brought considerable worry to the first philosophers concerned with linguistic problems; linguistics could only begin to evolve as a science after this contradiction had been overcome. Ancient philosophers reasoned about language the way we do about mythology. On the one hand, they did notice that in a given language certain sequences of sounds were associated with definite meanings, and they earnestly aimed at discovering a reason for the linkage between those sounds and that meaning. Their attempt, however, was thwarted from the very beginning by the fact that the same sounds were equally present in other languages although the meaning they conveyed was entirely different. The contradiction was surmounted only by the discovery that it is the combination of sounds, not the sounds themselves, which provides the significant data. . . .

To invite the mythologist to compare his precarious situation with that of the linguist in the prescientific stage is not enough. As a matter of fact we may thus be led only from one difficulty to another. There is a very good reason why myth cannot simply be treated as language if its specific problems are to be solved; myth is language: to be known, myth has to be told; it is a part of human speech. In order to preserve its specificity we must be able to show that it is both the same things as language, and also something different from it. Here, too, the past experience of linguists may help us. For language itself can be analyzed into things which are at the same time similar and yet different. This is precisely what is expressed in Saussure's distinction between langue and parole, one being the structural side of language, the other the statistical aspect of it, langue belonging to a reversible time, parole being nonreversible. If those two levels already exist in language, then a third one can conceivably be isolated.

We have distinguished langue and parole by the different time referents which they use. Keeping this in mind, we may notice that myth uses a third referent which combines the properties of the first two. On the one hand, a myth always refers to events alleged have taken place long ago. But what gives the myth an operational value is that the specific pattern described is timeless; it explains the present and the past as well as the future. This can be made clear through a comparison between myth and what appears to have largely replaced it in modern societies, namely, politics. When the historian refers to the French Revolution, it is always as a sequence of past happenings, a non-reversible series of events the remote consequences of which may still be felt at present. But to the French politician, as well as to his followers, the French Revolution is both a sequence belonging to the past as--to the historian--and a timeless pattern which can be detected in the contemporary French social structure and which provides a clue for its interpretation, a lead from which to infer future developments. Michelet, for instance, was a politically minded historian. He describes the French Revolution thus: "That day . . . everything was possible. . . . Future became present . . . that is, no more time, a glimpse of eternity." It is that double structure, altogether historical and ahistorical, which explains how myth, while pertaining to the realm of parole and calling for an explanation as such, as well as to that of langue in which it is expressed, can also be an absolute entity on a third level which, though it remains linguistic by nature, is nevertheless distinct from the other two. . . .

Whatever our ignorance of the language and the culture of the people where it originated, a myth is still felt as a myth by any reader anywhere in the world. Its substance does not lie in its style, its original music, or its syntax, but in the story which it tells. Myth is language, functioning on an especially high level where meaning succeeds practically at "taking off" from the linguistic ground on which it keeps on rolling. . . .

Now for a concrete example of the method we propose. We shall use the Oedipus myth, which is well known to everyone. I am well aware that the Oedipus myth has only reached us under late forms and through literary transmutations concerned more with esthetic and moral preoccupations than with religious or ritual ones whatever these may have been. But we shall not interpret the Oedipus myth in literal terms, much less offer an explanation acceptable to the specialist. We simply wish to illustrate--and without reaching any conclusions with respect to it --a certain technique, whose use is probably not legitimate in this particular instance, owing to the problematic elements indicated above. The "demonstration" should therefore be conceived, not in terms of what the scientist means by this term, but at best in terms of what is meant by the street peddler, whose aim is not to achieve a concrete result, but to explain, as succinctly as possible, the functioning of the mechanical toy which he is trying to sell to the onlookers.

The myth will be treated as an orchestra score would be if it were unwittingly considered as a unilinear series; our task is to reestablish the correct arrangement. Say, for instance, we were confronted with a sequence of the type: 1,2,4,7,8,2,3,4,6,8, 1,4,5,7,8,1,2,5,7,3,4,5,6,8 . . . , the assignment being to put all the l's together, all the 2's, the 3's, etc.; the result is a chart:

We shall attempt to perform the same kind of operation on the Oedipus myth trying out several arrangements of the mythemes until we find one which is in harmony with the principles enumerated above. Let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that the best arrangement is the following (although it might certainly be improved with the help of a specialist in Greek mythology):

We thus find ourselves confronted with four vertical columns, each of which includes several relations belonging to the same bundle. Were we to tell the myth, we would disregard the columns and read the rows from left to right and from top to bottom. But if we want to understand the myth, then we will have to disregard one half of the diachronic dimension (top to bottom) and read from left to right, column after column, each one being considered as a unit.

All the relations belonging to the same column exhibit one common feature which it is our task to discover. For instance, all the events grouped in the first column on the left have something to do with blood relations which are overemphasized, that is, are more intimate than they should be. Let us say, then, that the first column has as its common feature the overrating of blood relations. It is obvious that the second column expressed the same thing, but inverted: underrating of blood relations. The third column refers to monsters being slain. As to the fourth, a few words of clarification are needed. The remarkable connotation of the surnames in Oedipus' father-line has often been noticed. However, linguists usually disregard it, since to them the only way to define the meaning of a term is to investigate all the contexts in which it appears, and personal names, precisely because they are used as such, are not accompanied by any context. With the method we propose to follow the objection disappears, since the myth itself provides its own context. The significance is no longer to be sought in the eventual meaning of each name, but in the fact that all the names have a common feature: All the hypothetical meanings (which may well remain hypothetical) refer to difficulties in walking straight and standing upright.

What then is the relationship between the two columns on the right? Column three refers to monsters. The dragon is a chthonian being which has to be killed in order that mankind be born from the Earth; the Sphinx is a monster unwilling to permit men to live. The last unit reproduces the first one, which has to do with the autochthonous origin of mankind. Since the molesters are overcome by men, we may thus say that the common feature of the third column is denial of the autochthonous origin of man.

This immediately helps us to understand the meaning of the fourth column. In mythology it is a universal characteristic of men born from the Earth that at the moment they emerge from the depth they either cannot walk or they walk clumsily. This is the case of the chthonian beings in the mythology of the Pueblo: Muyingwu, who leads the emergence, and the chthonian Shumaikoli are lame ("bleeding-foot," "sore-foot"). The same happens to the Koskimo of the Kwakiutl after they have been swallowed by the chthonian monster, Tsiakish: When they returned to the surface of the earth "they limped forward or tripped sideways." Thus the common feature of the fourth column is the persistence of the autochthonous origin of man. It follows that column four is to column three as column one is to column two. The inability to connect two kinds of relationships is overcome (or rather replaced) by the assertion that contradictory relationships are identical inasmuch as they are both self-contradictory in a similar way. Although this is still a provisional formulation of the structure of mythical thought, it is sufficient at this stage.

Turning back to the Oedipus myth, we may now see what it means. The myth has to do with the inability, for a culture which holds the belief that mankind is autochthonous (see, for instance, Pausanias, VIII, xxix, 4: plants provide a model for humans), to find a satisfactory transition between this theory and the knowledge that human beings are actually born from the union of man and woman. Although the problem obviously cannot be solved, the Oedipus myth provides a kind of logical tool which relates the original problem--born from one or born from two?-- to the derivative problem: born from different or born from same? By a correlation of this type, the overrating of blood relations is to the underrating of blood relations as the attempt to escape autochthony is to the impossibility to succeed in it. Although experience contradicts theory, social life validates cosmology by its similarity of structure. Hence cosmology is true.